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The mysterious black box of Europe 's expansion

(submitted for the Nico Colchester 2004 contest)

by Victor Tsilonis

In 6 April 1994 the then Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when his plane crashed near Kigali , the Rwandan capital. In 10 March 2004 , just a few weeks preceding the 10 th anniversary of Rwanda 's genocide, the eminent French newspaper Le Monde published an article revealing, inter alia , that the black box had been clandestinely held in UN headquarters during all this time. After a few days of constant denials, the UN spokesman, Fred Eckhard, eventually acknowledged the existence of a mysterious black box, which had been negligently sunk in oblivion for the last decade. Even now, nobody seems to know what information exactly the black box contain or how useful can it be for enlightening the disastrous saga of the Rwandan genocide. Likewise the issue of Europe 's enlargement is today another mysterious black box awaiting its discovery from the French or other Europeans. Presently, nobody can truly foresee how and under what conditions the issue of Europe's expansion will develop, i.e., which the next member states will be and under what conditions will they ultimately enter into the European Union.

Certainly, one might abruptly interrupt the above syllogism and contend in a rather spontaneous manner that its inference is totally erroneous. In other words, one can argue with illusive forcefulness that the Copenhagen criteria and the well known ‘integration timetable' precisely map the acceptance procedure of new member states within the European Union.

Indeed, the 1993 Copenhagen summit supposedly set the fulfilment of three essential criteria before a new state attains EU membership status: 1) First, a sine qua non condition is that the candidate state must have a stable regime which secures democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and protection of minorities. 2) Second, the candidate state must demonstrate that it acquires a market economy with the capability of sustaining the inherent competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union. 3) Third, the candidate state must amply show that it possesses the requisite willingness for accepting the serious commitments that membership dictates, like the adoption of the political, economic and monetary unity.

Moreover, one can ostensibly fortify further his opposition to the ‘black box inference' boasting about the forthcoming gigantic enlargement of Europe which will engulf ten more countries by 1 May 2004 ( Cyprus , the Czech Republic , Estonia , Hungary , Latvia , Lithuania , Malta , Poland , Slovakia and Slovenia ). Last but not least, one can -while icing on the cake- predict with considerable certainty that Rumania and Bulgaria will be the next states joining the European Union sometime around 2007.

Nevertheless, unlike the Rwandan black box, the black box of Europe 's expansion is doomed to remain stuck into a tiny dusty office in Brussels for some time longer. Unfortunately or not, a considerable number of unresolved and vaguely defined issues, which critically hinder our foresight, still linger. These issues could be more or less succinctly epitomised into two categories: a) The approach, very similar in context to Einstein's theory of relativity, that European Union has embraced in implementing the Copenhagen criteria. b) The indecisiveness and uncertainty of European Union about its future stance towards the acceptance of certain states.

How elastic is this approach? Some figures might provide us with crucial assistance in our efforts to perceive the flexibility Copenhagen rules are applied. The GDP per head average of the ten new member states is approximately equal to 40% of the average GDP level that the existing 15 EU member states have. While we might be extremely sympathetic to turn a blind eye in the cases of Cyprus and Slovenia whose GDP levels reach approximately 70% of the average EU level, at the same time we cannot but be astounded by the fact that Latvia 's GDP level is merely close to the rock bottom 35% of the average EU level. Do these figures of economic wealth bespeak that the ten new states fulfil the second criterion of the Copenhagen rules, not to mention the capability of implementing the third criterion? Few would prefer “yes” than “no”.

Turning now to the second problematic category Turkey serves as a fine example. By 2013 Turkey 's population will be roughly equal to the population of the ten new member states combined (around 78 million). Turkey has been almost perennially petitioning for gaining acceptance in the European Union but this thorny for many European countries matter was restfully shrouded into a fog of mystery replete with ‘special relationship' promises thus far. Hence, despite Turkey 's obstinate requests, substantive talks regarding membership have not yet commenced and it is still nebulous whether the European Union will decide to begin them in 2005. However, even if the membership negotiations start in 2005 this will merely signify the possibility of Turkey becoming a fully-fledged member no earlier than 2013. Meanwhile, Turkey should make all necessary efforts to meet the seemingly stringent Copenhagen criteria but the outcome of these efforts as well as the flexibility degree of EU criteria applied in this case are unpredictable.

Europe cannot expand everlastingly like a mutated gigantic crop whose natural mechanisms of stopping growth have been neutralized. It must reach certain territorial based limits because unequivocally the aim of the European Union is not the creation of a World Union. Inevitably these limits cannot be expanded beyond what is broadly conceived as ‘ Europe ', although what the term Europe denotes is not always sufficiently clear (for example Israel is considered part of Europe at least for many sports-related purposes). The European Union cannot also expand irrespective of the will of the potential new candidates: Russia is facing European Union with exceeding scepticism, Sweden appears reluctant to become full member, Switzerland has not ceased adhering to its precious neutrality doctrine and consequently these states cannot become EU members unless they first categorically express their will to do so. On the other hand, European Union should set interpretative guidelines for the Copenhagen criteria and improvise a long-term stable policy regarding the enlargement agenda. But until then, the Europe 's black box will patiently await its discovery.